Rhysida Stole 784GB From Waterman Group, Including a Password Register and Payroll Data
The Rhysida ransomware group claims it stole 784GB from Australian engineering consultancy Waterman Group, including a password register covering 70 accounts and payroll data for 39 staff.

The Rhysida ransomware group has claimed responsibility for a major data theft from Waterman Group, an Australian engineering consultancy, and the details are worse than the headline number. The group says it exfiltrated 205,072 files totaling 784.22GB from Waterman Group (AUS) Pty Ltd and Waterman AHW Pty Ltd, firms with offices in Sydney and Melbourne. The claim surfaced on November 17, and the stolen set reportedly includes a password register, payroll information, and credentials for government tender portals. This is not a smash-and-grab. It is the kind of haul that keeps working for the attackers long after the initial theft.
The Waterman Group Breach Password Register Is the Real Problem
The most damaging item in the claimed haul is a password register covering approximately 70 accounts, including domain credentials, Microsoft 365 and Azure logins, Synology NAS access, Dropbox, and HSBC bank access. Alongside it, the attackers reportedly took credentials for tender portals such as AusTender, buyNSW, ICN, and TenderLink, plus payroll information from September 30, 2026, containing bank details for 39 employees. A password register is a multiplier. One stolen file hands the attackers the keys to email, cloud storage, banking, and the government procurement systems the firm uses to win work.
Waterman Group is a subsidiary of the UK-based Waterman Group plc, which is part of the Japanese firm CTI Engineering. It is an engineering consultancy, which means its systems hold project designs, client data, and the tender documents that decide who builds public infrastructure. That profile makes it a useful target twice over: the data has value on its own, and access to a consultancy's systems can become a path into its clients' projects. The source reporting the claim does not specify the initial attack vector, so we do not know how Rhysida got in.
What We Do Not Know Yet
Some caution is in order. This is a ransomware group's claim, recorded by threat trackers, not a confirmed breach disclosure from the company. The 784GB figure, the file count, and the contents all come from the attackers' own listing. Waterman has not publicly confirmed the incident at the time of writing, and investigators have not established whether ransomware encryption was involved or whether this was purely data theft for extortion. The pattern in similar cases is that the core facts, that data was taken and roughly how much, usually hold up, while the details get argued over for weeks.
That caution does not make the claim ignorable. Rhysida is an active, prolific group, and this is its second big listing in as many days: on November 18 it published 33GB of data from KK Technologies, a Canadian manufacturer, including accounting records covering 27,681 customer transactions and personnel files for 572 employees. The group is running a volume operation, and engineering and manufacturing firms are squarely in its sights.
Why Engineering Firms Are Targets
The Waterman case fits a pattern that has been building all month. The Nitori breach may have exposed 37.62 million customer records after three weeks of undetected access. The Vanderbilt University attack saw the BYOD gang claim more than a million Social Security numbers. The Singapore breach wave hit four organizations in a single week. Attackers are not picky about sectors. They are picky about one thing: organizations that hold data someone will pay to recover or pay to keep quiet.
Engineering consultancies are attractive because their credentials open doors beyond their own network. Tender portal access can be used to view or manipulate bids. Client project data can be used to target the next victim down the chain. And payroll data with bank details is directly monetizable. A firm like Waterman does not need to be a household name to be a valuable target. It needs to hold keys, and it does.
What to Do If You Work With Waterman
If your organization works with Waterman Group or shares systems with it, treat this as an active incident until proven otherwise. Rotate any credentials shared with the firm, watch for phishing emails that reference Waterman projects or tenders, and check whether any of your staff appear in the claimed payroll data. The tender portal credentials are the sharpest edge: if the attackers can log into AusTender or buyNSW as Waterman, they can see live procurement activity. Government clients should be checking access logs, not waiting for a press release.
For everyone else, the lesson is the password register. Seventy accounts in one file, spanning email, cloud, storage, and banking, is what happens when credentials accumulate in documents instead of a password manager with proper access controls. One file should never hold the keys to everything. When it does, a single breach becomes a skeleton key, and the attackers know it.


